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CHARLES M. BROWN
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Last fall, while attending one of my favorite academic conferences, I
was having dinner with an old classmate who, knowing that I went into government service after graduation, asked, “Do you government folks really
learn that much from us academics?” While I cannot speak for every government employee, I would say to my friend that, “Yes, there is a great deal we
learn from you academics.” His question has stayed with me; how much is
to be learned from academics regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran, possibly one of the most opaque, vexing, and frustrating agenda items for the US
government? Truth is, there is a great deal to learn. Iran is the topic of maybe
a dozen or so good books annually, along with dozens of articles in various
academic, military, and policy journals. The volumes under review here represent a range of styles and are intended for varying purposes and audiences.
They are by no means the best of their genre, but most exhibit exceptional
quality, expand the body of knowledge on Iran, and more importantly to us
“government types,” offer fresh ideas that inform our thinking.
These five books represent three distinct, but at times overlapping categories, of today’s informed writing on the Islamic Republic of Iran. We have
books that aim to contextualize or refine existing contexts for contemporary
Iran. Steven Ward, John Limbert, and Frederic Wehrey’s, et al. works would
seem to fit this schema rather easily. Some of the books try to define viable
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US policy options. Certainly, the work by Wehrey and his fellow authors
naturally fits here too, especially given that this volume was contracted to
them by the US Air Force for precisely that purpose. Pollack, et al. does this
too, thinking through nine distinct policy options for a new US administration. Limbert offers a fourteen-point list for how US officials who may find
themselves sitting at the table with Iranian interlocutors should approach
the issues. Dore Gold’s book, very much in a category by itself, given its
alarmist nature, states that the failure of US diplomatic policy toward Iran
necessitates a much more aggressive policy—regime change—as the only
option worth considering, especially in light of the discoveries related to the
scope of Iran’s nuclear development. Gold’s book also, by itself, is representative of a third category: using the “Iran issue” as a polemic for restating the
case against Iran, while presenting policy options short of military action,
and reminding us of Israel’s sense of threat. Gold may stand alone in this
particular selection of books, but he is far from alone in a sub-genre that
envisions a palpable, imminent threat from Iran while dismissing the notion
of subsequent diplomatic strategies with Iran as nothing less than Neville
Chamberlain-style appeasement.
The Long History of Iranian Arms
Steven Ward’s book Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its
Armed Forces begins our review. Ward, a senior intelligence analyst at the
CIA and a former Deputy National Intelligence Officer for the Near East, has
written publicly on Iranian military doctrine, and is particularly well-placed
to offer a perspective on Iran’s military history. This book is easily the most
original covered in this review, given the fact that it is the first military history
of Iran written in English for a nonspecialist audience. Ward’s approach
could be criticized for relying too much on secondary sources to create his
historical narrative; there are a few primary sources in Farsi consulted for
this work. This particular book fills a long-neglected gap in the literature of
this critical topic. Since the 2010 election debacle heightened awareness of
many Americans regarding the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
in Iranian political life, readers may wish to supplement Ward’s book which
was published just three months before the elections. In the context of the
post election unrest and the oft-heard analysis “inside the beltway” that the
June elections represented the IRGC decisively taking over many areas
of state administration that previously were the prerogative of the Islamic
Republic’s clerical leaders. One may wish to supplement Ward’s volume
with a pair of RAND studies, The Rise of the Pasdaran and Mullahs, Guards,
and Bonyads, that help contextualize the IRGC in military, economic, and
political contexts.
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Immortal is not without its shortcomings: the treatment of the IranIraq War, which seems to be in need of a broader introduction and context
to help the reader see the larger picture of that era-defining conflict. The
abrupt end of the narrative between the chapter on the Iran-Iraq War and the
concluding chapter makes it clear that there was probably a lack of source
material. Ward’s book is primarily a survey of the Iranian military art from
roughly 500 BCE to 1988 CE. There is no thorough treatment of the 1990s
or the periods during and after Operations Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom,
and Iraqi Freedom. But this is a minor criticism. Ward deserves great credit
for producing an eminently readable survey of the past 2,500 years of
Iranian military history, and given the volume of sources synthesized, this
was no easy task. The book does an admirable job filling a gaping hole in the
literature on modern Iran, and will be useful for foreign policy practitioners
and academics alike.
The Ghosts Are in the Room
John Limbert, a former hostage of the Islamic Republic during the
1979-81 crisis, presents four case studies of Iran at the negotiating table over
a period of six decades in his Negotiating with Iran: Wrestling the Ghosts of
History. Ambassador Limbert (who has a 45-year connection with Iran and
is one of the few US government employees fluent in Farsi) most recently
served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iran. He is certainly one
of the most experienced and intimately acquainted with Iran and its policies
and personalities of all US officials. He is quite possibly the only US official
to have a conversation with Iran’s Supreme Leader. Negotiating with Iran
is a highly-nuanced account written especially for Americans who might
have an opportunity to sit toe-to-toe with the Iranians. This monograph is
also a first-of-its-kind in that almost all historical accounts of the cases presented are seldom written with an eye toward how the United States could
negotiate with the Islamic Republic. The case studies include two examples
from before the Islamic Revolution and two following, making this book
one about negotiating with Iran, not necessarily about negotiating with the
Islamic Republic of Iran. The cases are the Azerbaijan Crisis (1945-47); the
nationalization of the Iranian oil industry under Prime Minister Mohammad
Mosadegh (1951-53); just after the Islamic Revolution, the US Embassy
Hostage Crisis (1979-81); and the efforts to free Western hostages in Lebanon
during the mid- and late-1980s. Each study includes a lengthy and detailed
reexamination of the facts of the case, with an emphasis on how Iranian
leaders of the time negotiated with interlocutors to advance various agendas,
and what this history should tell us. Throughout the book, the author applies
Roger Fisher and William Ury’s negotiation methodologies to each of the

Autumn 2010

3

Charles M. Brown

cases. Fisher, a master negotiator who attempted to find common ground
with Ayatollah Muhammad Husayni Beheshti in a failed attempt to end the
crisis and free Limbert and his 65 fellow hostages, developed the concept
of “Best Alternatives to Negotiated Agreement” (BATNA) in his seminal
work, co-authored with William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement
Without Giving In. Limbert examines the various BATNAs of the cases—the
best solution, or least bad one, the Iranians could get without negotiating
a solution to the issue at hand—and how these might have influenced a
settlement of some sort.
The strength of Limbert’s approach is the combination of intimate
knowledge of each case and the Iranian historical and political contexts
in combination with the application of Fisher and Ury’s methodology.
Understanding the complex decision trees that Iranian leaders have internalized during the events gives clarity to why they took the seemingly
incomprehensible actions they did—such as keeping US hostages for 444
days, well past the point where the hostages offered any kind of political
leverage, and where they became major liabilities for the regime. Limbert
espouses fourteen lessons “history has taught us” regarding how Iranians
negotiate and the limits reasonably expected from Iranian interlocutors.
Among the most important of these points is that the “past matters: be aware
of Iran’s historical greatness, its recent weakness, and its grievances from
decades or centuries before.” Good advice, and thankfully Limbert prevents
overeager would-be negotiators from going overboard into Iranophilia
by reminding us that “American negotiators need not be scholars of
Iran . . . .They should, however, at least be aware of the past that has gone into
forming the views and approaches of the Iranian side.”
Limbert’s most important point is that for Iranians the past is much
more alive than it is for Americans. The “Ghosts of History” are indeed in
the room, but forward-looking Americans often fail to see them, while for
Iranians, the ghosts are not only acknowledged but often take center stage.
One of the biggest mistakes that could be made for any serious analyst or
negotiator with Iran is to write off the past as “ancient history” and move on
to today’s issues. For Iranians, issues of yesterday and today merge, especially when Iranians believe America may be responsible for those issues.
Equally damaging for Iran’s interlocutors is any attempt to game the Iranian
political system in an effort to gain an advantage over one of its factions or
to dictate Iran’s own self-interest to Iranians. The former is ever-changing
and the latter is transparently paternalistic. Understanding the past 300 or
so years—when Iran fell from its status as a superpower to a developing
power—and how this history affects Iranian poltical culture will certainly
assist policy-makers, planners, diplomats, and analysts. A combination of
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grandeur and grievance plays in Iran’s political culture as Iranians remember
what they were and grieve for what they can no longer be.
Misrepresenting Iran
Dore Gold’s The Rise of Nuclear Iran: How Tehran Defies the West
is in many ways the inverse of Limbert’s work. Gold’s main agenda is to
ensure that Tehran is presented in the worst light possible. Given this task,
Gold’s book adds little to the literature on Iran and does not contribute to
a greater understanding of Iranian decision-making. The author presents
numerous under-supported claims as fact, and attempts to ensure the reader
knows how the Iran-focused portion of the academic community was not
only wrong about Iran, but these academics are to admit their “mistakes” and
are not worth listening to. He is particularly scornful of James Bill and the
late Richard Cottam for giving upbeat assessments of the Khomeini regime,
which when translated through Gold’s mindset, is tantamount to being supportive of Khomeini. This is a gross oversimplification given the fact that
nowhere in the writings of Bill or Cottam can one discern a hint of support
for Khomeini. Both of these authors are widely cited by students and experts
alike, and for good reason, since their works are standard-setting. In fact,
Bill and Cottam are cited or included in the bibliographies of three of the
books in this review essay. Gold’s focus on studies made over a generation
ago during the infancy of the Islamic Republic overlooks ideas detailed in
a number of books on Iran published since that time. It is not necessary, nor
helpful, to establish in writing where an author stands politically vis-a-vis the
contemporary Iranian regime. Gold, the former Ambassador to the United
Nations from the State of Israel and foreign policy adviser to Prime Minister
Netanyahu, also makes certain that the Palestinians, especially Yasser
Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization and Iran, are linked. Although
this may be true enough, it sounds a lot like a score-settling exercise in the
context Gold creates. Gold’s book, then, is less an analysis of Iranian politics
than it is a polemic on why regime change is the essential policy option.
Among some of the more jarring factual errors Gold presents
includes the notion that the 1979-81 Hostage Crisis was “in collusion with”
the highest levels of the regime, when in fact the embassy takeover was
conceived and executed without advance knowledge by Iranian leadership.
Likewise, his claim sourced to unspecified “experts” that the detonation of
the US Marine Corps barracks in Beirut in 1983 as “the largest non-nuclear
explosion that had ever been detonated on the face of the earth” is almost
certainly hyperbole. Additionally, Gold’s claim that Sunni Muslims had not
used suicide bombings until Hamas started doing so in 1994 is similarly erroneous. There are a number of such errors that collectively undermine the

Autumn 2010

5

Charles M. Brown

book’s credibility. The argumentation suffers from occasional internal inconsistency, such as declarations that the Islamic Republic is not deterrable, but
then listing occurrences when it was in fact, deterred. The author’s portrayal
of Tehran as a monolithic bloc with little distinction between the agendas of
its various personalities, despite overwhelming evidence of a high degree of
factionalization within the regime, simultaneously obscures the nature of the
regime while understating the difficulty of the challenge faced by the West,
the United States in particular, in coming to terms with the future of Iranian
policy. Gold is correct in pointing out the repressive and retrograde tendencies of this regime. Although it would appear those tendencies are obvious,
it seems that the task at hand, if we do not choose the military option, is to
find those opportunities within a larger political framework of international
actors and possibly within the factions of Tehran’s regime, that can bring an
end to the twin issues of nuclear proliferation and Iranian state support for
various terrorist or militia activities.
Iran’s Regional Resurgence
Dangerous But Not Omnipotent is the RAND Corporation’s short
analysis of Iran’s increasingly hegemonic role in the Middle East and how
it is perceived in the Arab states. It is arguably the least controversial of the
books considered in this review essay. In examining Iran’s regional role,
this analysis trods little new ground. It does examine Iranian support for
various regional entities ranging from Lebanese Hizballah to Iraq’s Mahdi
Army, much of which have been the bread and butter of the think tank community for several years. The real value in this version of the story is the
fact it is succinctly in a single volume. Even of greater importance is having
Iran’s external activities portrayed in relation to its strategic culture, coupled
with the understanding that deriving specific intent from Iranian actions is
ambiguous even at the best of times. “What seems like a drive for hegemony
may in fact be a form of deterrence or the manifestation of an ambition for
increased stature and ‘indispensability’ in the midst of isolation and encirclement.” One of the primary reasons it is so difficult to assess the regime is the
factionalization within the regime. As stated earlier, Gold refuses to deal with
this facet of the Islamic Republic; Pollack states unequivocally that “The
Iranian political system is one of the most complex, Byzantine, fragmented,
and opaque on earth.” The RAND study, led by author Frederic Wehrey,
a former Air Force officer, offers more specificity by defining the various
camps within the Iranian regime and giving a detailed analysis of how this
factionalization affects the US-Iran relationship. Wehrey and his fellow
authors rationalize how this factionalization affected “benchmark” events in
the Islamic Republic’s relations with the West including the religious edict
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calling for the murder of British author Salman Rushdie and the on-going
confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program.
Dangerous But Not Omnipotent also provides a much-needed analysis of the fact that Iran has always had a close relationship with Lebanese
Hizballah, but there are limits to the degree which Iran actually can control
the organization. This book reaffirms themes in a growing body of research
that groups like Hizballah, and probably some of the Iraqi Shia militias as
well, can and do act independently of Iran, and that notions of Iran pulling
strings of “proxies” with the intention of using them to achieve regional
hegemony is likely an oversimplification of the dynamics between Iran and
these groups. While it is quite unlikely that we will see any kind of complete
break between Iran and these groups, the following statement is noteworthy:
“The image of Hizballah as a client of Iran . . . is becoming obsolete.” It is
unfortunate that the RAND study is the only book of those under review to
explore this theme.
On Iraqi groups, Wehrey and his co-authors are equally insightful,
dedicating an entire section on “Iranian Support of Iraqi Groups Does Not
Equal Control.” It is worth noting, however, that a discussion on the complexity involved between Iran and Iraqi groups—especially Iran’s closest
strategic partner, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq—could have been
strengthened by including the fact that Ba’th regime’s purges and deportations of a quarter-million Iraqi Shia of Iranian descent resulted in complex
interaction inside the Islamic regime, to say nothing of Iranian society. In
fact, some personalities from the large Iraqi constituency exiled to Iran have
become senior officials in Iran: the Najaf-born Ali Larijani, the Speaker of
the Majles (Parliament) and likely candidate in the next presidential election;
his younger brother Ayatollah Sadiq Larijani, head of the Iranian Judiciary;
and Ayatollah Mahmud Hashemi-Shahrudi, a founding member of the group
that became the Supreme Council. This constituency, and its members inside
the Iranian regime, guarantees that contrary to the overly-simplistic belief of
some officials and pundits, Iraq and Iran are unable to be extricated from one
another. Highlighting more of this complex relationship would serve the goal
of contextualizing the new relationship Iran and Iraq are developing. This is
extremely important as Iraq starts its recovery from decades of dictatorship,
Iran’s quarter-million Iraqi refugees from that period continue to be absorbed
into Iranian society, and the Iranian regime prepares for the real possibility of
having a non-Persian president.
Another plus for the RAND study was it is the only book of those
reviewed in this essay to make concerted use of the Open Source Center’s
(OSC) many holdings on Iran. Ward used a smattering of OSC reports in
the latter chapters of Immortal, but Dangerous has made far greater use
of these sources.
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What Next?
Which Path to Persia? Options for a New American Strategy Toward
Iran offers analysis of several policy options related to Iran. The nearlyubiquitous Kenneth Pollack is lead author of a highly-useful analysis of nine
distinct policies that could be implemented in dealing with Iran. The value
of this volume, co-written by well-known think tank community personalities such as—Daniel Byman, Martin Indyk, Suzanne Maloney, Michael
O’Hanlon, and Bruce Riedel—is that each option is presented in the same
format, without editorial comments related to which option the authors
prefer. Policy goals, windows of opportunity, political requirements, and a
pro/con analysis are applied to all nine options, giving those charged with
planning for contingencies a head start. While the events of the past year
appear to have put various diplomatic experiments with Iran in a state of suspended animation, running through these options is a worthwhile exercise as
America continues to watch for opportunities.
The policy options examined are based on two diplomatic strategies:
persuasion and engagement; three military options: invasion, airstrikes, or
permitting Israeli airstrikes; three regime change choices: offering support
to a popular uprising in the “velvet revolution” sense, a similar strategy
offered to one of Iran’s minority or opposition groups, and support of a
military coup; the last option Pollack’s working group considered resembles
more of the same: containment. Whichever strategy, or combination of strategies, the administration chooses, it acts against the ticking clock of Iran’s
developing nuclear program. Citing the last National Intelligence Estimate
of Iran’s nuclear capacity, Pollack reminds us that the next five years are
“the more likely time frame” for the Islamic Republic to produce sufficient fissile material for a single warhead. Thus, time is of the essence in
implementing any strategy designed to steer Iran away from this objective.
Complicating any of these options, especially for the nonmilitary ones, is last
June’s contested election. Any of these strategies will require significantly
more cooperation between the United States and its international partners,
and almost certainly will require a substantial investment in time that we
may not have if we want to ensure a nonnuclear Iran. Any such strategy will
almost certainly involve unilateral US actions aimed at strengthening United
Nations resolutions against Iran, and adjusting bilateral relations between
our allies and Iran. This last strategy against Iran’s development of nuclear
technology is probably beyond direct US involvement, and reflects how any
effort against the Islamic Republic will ripple through an increasing swath of
American foreign relations.
The authors of Which Path are the first to point out that the nine policies they examine represent “nine bad options” none of which are optimal and
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all of which have a low likelihood of success. The options presented are also
not mutually exclusive. They represent fundamentals that can be combined
to give the United States maximum leverage against the likely scenarios of
Iran stalling for time, its flat-out rejection of the very premises of negotiations with the international community, and its continued efforts to enshrine
as policy encompassing a course of action that satisfies US concerns based
on entrenched anti-Americanism as a core element of the regime’s policymaking process. Thus, a future US policy toward Iran will need to combine
some of these diplomatic and military options. It will also require the United
States to be more flexible and patient than we have been if we are going to
give these approaches time to work.
Conclusion
This review essay should allow us greater insight into the answer I
gave my friend at the conference. A few of these books are standouts that
ought to be on every serious analyst or commentator’s shelf. Not every
volume adds greatly to the collective wisdom on the subject, but even those
that do not are revealing in that they show us where the political debates rest
in key constituencies. In addition to the substantive points that are brought
to the foreground in a number of these books, we also gained a clear sense
of the importance of what history means to Iran. This is certainly one of the
key issues Americans need to come to terms with when thinking about what
direction our Iran policy follows in these uncertain times. The reader will
also gain a clearer sense of just how confused the US response has been to the
Iranian challenge, how critical future policy decisions will be, and the fact
that the Iran issue is not going to resolve itself anytime soon.
The Reviewer: Charles M. Brown earned his M.A. in Middle East Studies
and History at the Middle East Center, University of Utah. He serves as a CIA
intelligence analyst focusing on Iraq.
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